This paper explores the unemployment rate disparity between different skill groups. The Current Population Survey data 1 reveal that low skill workers have a higher unemployment rate than high skill workers. The data also show that the difference in unemployment rate by skill is due to the difference in the job separation probabilities. This paper proposes differences in employee selection procedures that firms implement when searching for vacancies with different skill requirements as one of the explanations for the divergence in the job separation probabilities by skill. The paper uses a matching model with uncertainty regarding match specific quality to study how skill bias in employee selection procedures delivers unemployment rate disparity between skill groups. The model predicts that high skill firms utilize more effective employee selection procedures paying an extra cost instead of using a costless but less effective selection procedure. This effective employee selection procedure has a higher likelihood of delivering matches with high quality. Thus, high skill firms oftentimes end up with high quality matches, resulting in lower job separation rates. The model successfully replicates the difference in the probability of becoming unemployed, as well as the magnitude of the unemployment rate disparity across skill groups.
Low skill workers have a higher unemployment rate. This fact is not because they are less likely to find a job, but because they are more likely to become unemployed. This paper extends the empirical evidence on the difference in the unemployment experiences across skill groups to date using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data. It also proposes an explanation for the difference in job separation probabilities between these skill groups; high skill workers have lower job separation probabilities as they are selected more effectively during the hiring process. I use a labor search model with match specific quality to quantify the explanatory power of this explanation on differences in job separation probabilities and unemployment rates across skill groups.
I use data from the CPS, between January, 1976 and November, 2007, on prime age males to document the skill differences in unemployment experiences 2 . Over the sample period, low skill workers have, on average, twice the unemployment rate of high skill workers. High and low skill workers have average job finding probabilities of 33 and 34 percent, respectively, from 1976 to 2007. The difference in the job finding probability between skill groups is not large enough to cause the unemployment rate difference between these skill groups. Furthermore, low skill workers, compared to high skill workers, have an approximately three times higher probability of becoming unemployed. The dispersion in the job separation probability by skill is the basis of the difference in unemployment rate these skill groups face.
The purpose of this paper is to explain the difference in job separation probabilities between skill groups. The explanation is that firms with high skill vacancies have a higher opportunity cost of not hiring the best workers for the job. Consequently, firms who are looking for high skill workers follow more effective hiring strategies and screening processes than they would have done when searching for low skill workers. As a result of the more effective selection, high skill vacancies get higher quality matches; which are less likely to be terminated.
I use a discrete time infinite horizon labor matching model with heterogenous agents. There are two different skill groups in the economy. For simplicity, there is no interaction between these skill groups. For each skill group, a match between the firm and the worker can be either good or bad quality. The only difference between skill groups is that a good quality, high skill match produces a higher output than a good quality, low skill match. The true quality of the match is revealed after parties observe the output. Firms and workers learn about the probability of the match being good quality before they form the match, and they decide whether to form the match and produce or to detach. The probability of a match being good quality is drawn from a distribution, which is the selection technology. There are two technologies available: a costless employee selection technology, and a more effective but costly employee selection technology. The more effective technology has a higher likelihood of delivering high quality matches. I calibrate the model to match some data facts of the US labor markets. The model predicts that, in equilibrium, only high skill firms employ the more effective selection technology. As a result, high skill firms often get high quality matches, resulting in a lower job separation rate. The model also delivers the observed magnitudes of the unemployment rate and the job separation probability disparities across skill groups.
Survey studies confirm the existence of employee selection. Van Ours and Ridder (1992) analyze the hiring process of Dutch firms using establishment level survey data. Van Ours and Ridder show that firms form a pool of applicants shortly after the vacancy has been posted, and they use the rest of the vacancy duration to select the new employee from that specific pool. Hence, Van Ours and Ridder conclude, vacancy durations should be interpreted as selection periods. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that employee selection procedures differ by the skill requirement of the job. In a similar paper, Van Ours and Ridder (1993) report that the average vacancy duration increases with the required level of education and experience. In addition, Barron, Berger, and Black (1997) , and Barron and Bishop (1987) show that firms search more, both intensively and extensively, as the level of education, prior experience, and training requirements of the job increase. Barron and Bishop also report that total time spent on hiring is longer for high skill occupations, in comparison to low skill occupations.
The skill difference in unemployment experiences is also documented by other authors. Mincer (1991) uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data on the male labor force. He finds that higher levels of education reduce the risk of unemployment. The difference in the incidence of unemployment is more important than the difference in unemployment durations for educational differences in unemployment. Nagypal (2007) uses March Supplements and Displaced Worker Supplements of the CPS. She also finds differences in unemployment by education. Moreover, the differences in unemployment duration by education are not large enough to account for the differences in unemployment rates. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) use managerial vs. manual occupations, and Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002) use wages as a proxy for skill, and find a higher unemployment rate for low skill workers.
Hiring policies are used to answer some other facts regarding labor markets. Pries and Rogerson (2005) analyze differences in labor and job turnovers between the US and Europe. The differences in labor market policies of these economies generate differences in hiring policies of firms. Tasci (2006) looks at firms' hiring policies over the business cycle, and proposes changes in hiring behavior over the cycle as another mechanism to increase the response of the key aggregate labor market variables to productivity shocks.
To my knowledge, there are only two other papers that propose an explanation for the difference in job separation probabilities across skill. Moscarini (2002) quantifies the match specific capital and analyzes its implications for wage inequality. In the model, low skill workers have a comparative disadvantage in market work (lower wedge between productivity and opportunity cost of work). Thus, they do not tolerate mismatches and separate to unemployment more often than the high skill workers.
Nagypal (2007) focuses on the difference in levels and the standard deviations of unemployment rate across skill. Nagypal explains that the existence of match specific capital (information about the quality of a match) for high skill workers and the lack of such capital for low skill workers make low skill employment relations more vulnerable to adverse idiosyncratic shocks. She uses a matching model with firms employing both high and low skill workers, and with uncertainty regarding match quality for high-skill jobs. Firms' decisions to terminate a high skill match, when faced with an adverse idiosyncratic shock, depends on the accumulated information about the quality of that match. Nagypal constructs a numerical example to show that differences in learning about the match quality can generate differences in unemployment rates.
My paper differs from Nagypal (2007) in several ways. In this paper there is uncertainty regarding the match quality for both high and low skill employment relationships. There is no difference between skill groups in terms of learning about the match quality. Firms gather information about the match quality prior to the formation of the employment relationship (employee selection), which determines whether the relationship is formed. The difference in the job separation rate of skill groups arise not because there is match specific learning per se, but because firms can (and do) affect the nature of the information via employee selection procedures. This paper takes the model to the data to quantify the effect of the employee selection on job separation and unemployment rate disparity between skill groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section of the paper provides recent evidence on the hiring policies and unemployment experiences of different skill groups. Section two lays out the model. The equilibrium of the model is defined and analyzed in section three. Section four has the quantitative results of the model and is followed by concluding remarks.
Data

Unemployment Facts
To document the skill differences in unemployment, I use CPS data from January 1976 to November 2007 3 . CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households 4 . It is the primary source of information on the labor force characteristics of the U.S. population. I focus on prime age males (ages of 25 to 50), since they have the strongest labor market attachment among labor market participants. Following the standard definition for skill in the literature, I use education level as a proxy for skill. Workers without a college degree are low skill while those with at least 16 years of education (a college degree) are high skill workers.
To do the following calculations, I construct flow data by merging every two consecutive months of the CPS and seasonally adjust the flow data 5 . The unemployment rate is calculated as the ratio of the number of the unemployed in a particular month to size of the labor force in that month for each skill group. The first panel of Figure 1 illustrates the skill differentials in unemployment rates 6 . Although unemployment rates of both skill groups follow similar trends, the high skill unemployment rate is always below the low skill unemployment rate.
There are two determinants of unemployment. The first one is the job finding probability whereas the second one is the job separation probability. The job finding probability in a given month is the fraction of unemployed in the previous month that have become employed in the current month. The second panel of Figure 1 shows the job finding probabilities of skill groups. Low skill workers, on average, have higher job finding probabilities than high skill workers. One can also look at unemployment duration across skill groups. Although duration data reveal a slightly longer duration for low-skill workers, the difference is still not big enough for job finding probabilities to be the main actor of unemployment rate disparity. Moreover, Tristao (2007) uses National Longitudinal Survey of Youth-79 7 data and looks at the unemployment duration for detailed occupation groups. Low skill occupations have durations close to the overall average. Thus job finding probabilities are not different enough to cause the differences in unemployment rates.
The second determinant, the job separation rate, is also from merged CPS data. The job separation probability in a given month is the fraction of workers 3 The data can be downloaded from http://www.nber.org/data/cps basic.html 4 who were employed in the previous month, but are reported to be unemployed in the current month. The third panel of Figure 1 illustrates the job separation probabilities of skill groups over time. High skill workers have substantially lower rates than low skill workers. Note that the graph for separation rates resembles the graph for unemployment rates. These facts are robust to several different specifications of the data. I analyze the difference between skill groups in unemployment that is not due to lay-offs. The CPS collects data on the reason for unemployment after 1994. Over the period of 1994 to 2007, the average unemployment rate is 4.9 percent for low skill workers, and it is 2.1 percent for high skill workers. If we look only at unemployment for reasons other than lay-offs, the average unemployment rate is 3.9 percent and 1.9 percent for low and high skill workers, respectively. Clearly, lay-offs effect low skill workers more; however, higher lay-offs of low skill workers are not significant enough to account for the difference in unemployment rates.
These data facts are also robust to the cutoff for high and low-skill. Counting workers with some college education as high skill does change quantitative results but not enough for the gap to go away or decrease significantly. Moreover, the gap in the unemployment rate and the job separation probability is significant for more detailed categories of skill.
Observe that the separation rates given above are for the separations to unemployment. It is also informative to look at job separations that did not result in unemployment: job to job transitions. The CPS started, in 1994, to ask employed workers whether they are with the same employer as they were the previous month. During the 1994 -2007 period, less than two percent of employed workers in each skill group changed employers. Although there is a slight difference in numbers by skill, low-skill workers have substantially larger job separation probabilities (regardless of the destination of the separation). Table 1 summarizes unemployment experiences by skill group. Between January 1976 and November 2007, low skill workers experienced an average unemployment rate of five percent whereas high skill workers faced two percent. Moreover, low skill workers had a slightly better chance of finding jobs than their high skill counterparts. The data reveal that low skill workers have higher unemployment rates for the reason that they have higher job separation probabilities.
Hiring Processes
This section of the paper presents the data facts on employee selection and its differentials by skill. Van Ours and Ridder (1992) analyze the selection process of employers using Dutch establishment data. Van Ours and Ridder show that firms form an applicant pool shortly after (within the first two weeks) the vacancy has been posted, and the rest of the vacancy duration is used to select a new employee from that pool of applicants. They show that 80 percent of vacancies are filled with applicants who applied for the job within the first two weeks of the vacancy opening. Hence, they conclude, vacancy durations should be interpreted as selection periods.
There are differences in the intensity of search for employees, which firms conduct by the skill requirement of the vacancy. Van Ours and Ridder (1993) report that the mean selection period increases with the required level of education and experience. Moreover, Barron, Berger, and Black (1997) find that employers search more when hiring workers with more education and with prior experience and for jobs with higher training requirements. They show that as the education requirement of the vacancy increases, the number of interviews per offer and number of applicants per offer goes up (extensive search) as well as the number of hours per interview and per applicant (intensive search). Barron and Bishop (1987) report that total time spent on hiring is longer for high skill occupations, in comparison to low skill occupations.
There is also evidence on search for high skill workers being more effective. Bagger and Henningsen (2008) use Danish and Norwegian data and look at the job ending hazard rates by skill. Bagger and Henningsen find that for all skill levels the likelihood of a job ending decreases with tenure 8 . At low levels of tenure, low skill workers are more likely to separate from their jobs, and the difference diminishes as the tenure increases. The behavior of the hazard function gives the following information about the nature of high and low skill employment relationships. Declining hazards indicate that there is learning about the match quality for all skill levels. As tenure increases, surviving relationships are more likely to be ones of good quality, thus they are less likely to be terminated. However, learning about the match quality does not explain the difference in levels of hazards at the beginning of the tenure. For that to happen, high skill workers should be more likely to have good quality matches to begin with so that their employment relationships will less likely be terminated.
Model
The economy is inhabited by workers with two skill types. The skill type of a worker is observable and exogenous. There is also continuum of firms with heterogenous jobs. A firm can employ at most one worker. Firms and workers that search for an employment relationship are brought together via a matching function. I assume no interaction between high and low skill sectors, i.e., they are segregated.
Although there is empirical evidence in favor of interaction between labor markets, this simplifying assumption allows me to focus on the interaction between the unemployment rate and hiring policies of firms. Interactions across labor markets can take on many forms, affecting the unemployment rate disparity between sectors in different directions. One commonly modeled interaction across skill groups is that high skill workers can look for both high and low skill jobs while unemployed and can continue to search for high skill jobs if they exit from unemployment into a low skill job. However, granting such interaction will affect the unemployment rate of high skill workers through affecting their probability of finding a job in this model. Since this paper focuses on the causes of the job separation disparity between skill groups, which is the main factor of the unemployment rate gap, abstracting away from such interaction is plausible.
No interaction between skill groups allows me to solve for the equilibrium for each skill group separately. In consequence, the model explained below applies to each of the skill groups.
There is a continuum of homogenous workers, with total mass equal to one. There is also a continuum of ex-ante identical firms. All agents are risk neutral, and they discount future at rate β. A worker can be either unemployed or employed. When unemployed, workers consume unemployment benefits b.
The production unit in the economy is a firm-worker pair. The pair produces y = y i amount of output, where i is the quality of the match. y i takes on the value y g (y b ) if the match is good (bad) quality 9 , where y g > y b . I assume that the amount of bad quality output is the same across sectors while good quality output in the high skill sector is higher than the good quality output in the low skill sector. This is the only exogenous difference between skill groups. Wages are outcomes of Nash Bargaining, and µ is the worker's bargaining power.
Production units that are active (i.e. that produced) are subject to an exogenous destruction at rate δ, which is the same across sectors. Bagger and Henningsen (2008) estimate the monthly job hazard function for different education groups using data on Danish and Norwegian workers. At low levels of tenure, less educated workers have higher hazard rates. However, the difference closes after five years of tenure. Based on this evidence, it is plausible to assume the same exogenous destruction rate across groups.
Unemployment stems from frictions in the labor markets. These frictions are modeled via a matching function. The matching function provides a mapping between the number of vacancies (v) and the unemployed (u) and the number of total matches across firms and worker. Thus, it determines the matching probabilities of firms and workers with each other endogenously 10 . The matching function, M , is constant returns to scale. Consequently, it only depends on the vacancy-unemployment ratio v/u = θ , which is called the market tightness. A worker meets with a firm with probability f = M/u, and a vacant firm meets with a worker with probability q = M/v. The matching function also satisfies the following boundary conditions: f → 0 and q → 1 as θ → 0, and f → 1 and q → 0 as θ → ∞. Moreover, the probability that a worker meets with a vacancy, f , is an increasing function of θ while the probability of firms meeting with workers, q, decreases with θ, i.e., f (θ) > 0 and q (θ) < 0.
The quality of a match is ex-ante uncertain. The true quality of the match is revealed after the first period of production. Hence, a worker-firm pair does not know the quality of the match unless they produce. However, parties draw the probability of being in a good quality match, π, when they meet. After observing π, the worker and the firm decide whether to form the match. A higher value of π means that it is more likely that the match is good quality.
I model the employee selection procedure as a technology that randomly delivers a value of π to the firm-worker pair when they first match. π can be drawn from either a costless distribution Γ, or from a more effective distribution Ω, which comes at a cost (κ). The more effective the technology is, the more likely it is that the technology delivers higher values of π, i.e. Ω first order stochastically dominates Γ. More formally, Ω(π) ≤ Γ(π) ∀ π. One can think of more effective employee selection procedures as firms using more effective recruitment channels (i.e. advertising the job opening more extensively and intensively), better employee assessment, etc. that will result in a better quality match between firm and worker as opposed to the quality of a match had the firm not used the more effective technology. Another way of thinking of the more effective selection is as if firms sample from the same distribution multiple times and choose the highest π level. In this case the empirical distribution of π for firms that do multiple draws will first order stochastically dominate the original distribution.
I assume that y b ≤ b and y g > b. Under this assumption, bad quality matches are undesirable in equilibrium. Firm and worker pairs terminate such matches. If all the separations in this economy were to be exogenous, then the job separation rates in the equilibrium would be the same across skill groups. However, undesirability of bad quality matches generates endogenous separations, which is the source of the difference in job separation rates across sectors.
Timing of Events
• Each period begins with a number of unemployed workers; a number of worker-firm matches with known quality; and a number of worker-firm pairs that met in the previous period the first time and observed their π.
• All parties decide whether to produce or to detach.
• All workers that do not produce in the current period consume unemployment benefits.
• Worker-firm pairs that have decided to stay attached produce, and workers consume their wages.
• All the matches with unknown quality learn the match quality (Observe that separation decisions will be made at the beginning of the next period).
• Vacant firms decide whether to post a vacancy or not.
• The vacant firms choose a selection technology to use.
• Job markets open; unemployed workers and vacant firms meet.
• Firm-worker pairs that met learn the probability that their match will be good quality. They will decide at the beginning of next period whether to form the match or not.
• Job markets close.
• Exogenous destructions occur; δ fraction of worker-firm pairs that produced in the current period are destroyed.
• New period begins.
Bellman Equations
Let V be the value of a firm with a vacancy, and J(π) be the value of a firm in a match which is good quality with probability π. The value of a vacancy is the discounted value of expected profits, net of cost of the vacancy.
The first term of equation (1) is the per period cost of having a vacancy, c. The second term of (1) has a maximum operator since the firm will decide which selection procedure to implement. If the firm chooses the more effective distribution, then it pays the extra cost of using that distribution (κ). Regardless of the choice of the employee selection procedure, the firm will match with a worker with the probability q(θ). If the firm matches with a worker, then it will get the expected value of being in a match which is good quality with probability π. If the firm does not match with any worker, which happens with probability 1 − q(θ), then it will stay vacant and continue to get the value V. Equation (2) formalizes the decision problem of a firm which is in a match with a worker with the match being good quality with probability π.
where E(y|π) = πy g +(1−π)y b . The firm compares the expected discounted value of profits from producing output with the current worker to the discounted present value of separating (being vacant). The value the firm gets from producing with a worker with probability π of having a good quality match is the sum of the current period profit, which is the expected value of output produced minus the wage paid to the worker, and the discounted value of being in a match with the same worker the subsequent period, if the match survives. Observe that a surviving match is revealed to be good quality with probability π. In this case the firm will get the discounted present value of being in match with a worker with the match quality being good with probability one, J(1). However, with probability 1 − π the match quality will be revealed to be bad, and the firm will get the value J(0). With the assumption that y b ≤ b, firms and workers will separate in equilibrium if the match is bad quality, i.e. J(0) = V .
Let U be the value of unemployment to a worker, and W (π) be the value of being in a match with a firm to a worker where π is the probability that the match is good quality. Moreover, let λ be the probability that firms choose Ω as their employee selection technology.
If a worker is unemployed, she gets the unemployment benefit, b. The worker does not meet with any firms, thus continuing to get the value of being unemployed, with probability 1 − f (θ). The worker meets with a firm with probability f (θ), and gets an expected value from being in a match with a firm. Note that the expected value the worker gets from being in a match with the firm depends on the selection technology the firm has chosen.
If a worker is in a match with a firm and they have the probability π of the match being good quality, the worker decides whether to stay in the match or separate to unemployment. If she stays in the match, the worker gets the wage in the current period. If the match survives to the next period and it is revealed to be good quality, the worker will get the value of being in a good quality match with a firm, W (1) . If the match is revealed to be bad quality, which will happen with probability 1 − π, the worker will get the value of being in a bad quality match with a firm, W(0). Recall that, in equilibrium, a match will be terminated if it is bad quality, therefore W (0) = U .
The Nash wage bargaining assumption guarantees the unanimity of the separation or match formation decision. That is because parties bargain over the net surplus of forming the production unit, and if the surplus is positive (negative) they decide to form the match (separate). Hence there is no inconsistency across parties in decision making.
Worker Flow Across Employment States
Let u t , e g t , and e n t be the unemployment rate, good quality employment, and unknown quality employment at period t, respectively. Let X(π) = 1(0) be the decision of a worker-firm pair who observe π (not) to form the match. Moreover, let E(π|X(π) = 1) denote the expected value of the match being good quality, conditional on the match being formed, and let F ∈ {Γ, Ω} be the equilibrium selection technology.
The number of good quality matches in the subsequent period is the sum of the good quality matches of the current period and the current period unknown quality matches which are revealed to be good quality in the subsequent period that survive exogenous destruction.
Since all matches reveal their quality after the first period of production, the number of unknown quality matches in any period are the same as the number of matches formed in that period.
The number of the unemployed workers in the subsequent period is the sum of the unemployed in the current period who did not meet with a firm, the current period unemployed who met with a firm but drew a low π (thus stayed unemployed), the current period employed who were hit by an exogenous destruction shock, and the current period employed with unknown match quality who learned their match was of bad quality.
Equilibrium
The steady state equilibrium, for each of the sectors, is a list {e g , e n , v, u, λ, π * , w(π), X(π), J(π), V, W (π), U } such that
• {J(π), V, W (π), U } satisfy equations 2, 1, 4, and 3.
• V = 0.
• w(π) is the solution to the Nash bargaining, i.e.,
• The flows among employment and unemployment states are constant
Existence of the Equilibrium
It is easier to work with the match surplus to solve for the equilibrium in matching models. The match surplus is defined as the sum of the value of a match to the firm and to the worker, net of their outside options.
Substituting in values of J(π) and W (π) from the Bellman equations result in
Note that the match surplus is linear in π for π > π * , thus we can write the surplus as S(π) = (π − π * )S where S is
The equilibrium can be characterized by three variables. These are reservation probability, market tightness, and the choice of the employee selection technology.
11 There is also a flow equation that equates flows out of unemployment to flows into unemployemt.
uf E(X π ) = δe
Observe that given the two other flow equations, this equation is redundant. 12 One can write wages as a function of match surplus as well (1) 13 I take the derivative of S(π) with respect to π, substitute S(1) = (1−π * )S in, and rearrange the terms to get this expression.
For any employee selection technology F ∈ {Γ, Ω}, a pair (θ F , π * F ) is equilibrium if firms do not have incentives to deviate from using the F distribution. A (θ Ω , π * Ω ) pair is an equilibrium if it satisfies the following condition:
and, similarly, (θ Γ , π * Γ ) is an equilibrium if it satisfies
For the rest of the discussion, suppose F ∈ {Γ, Ω} is the distribution such that (θ F , π * F ) is an equilibrium. The values of (θ F , π * F ) are determined by the intersection of two curves: the optimal match formation curve (OMF) and the free entry curve (FE).
The optimal match formation curve delivers the reservation probability for any given market tightness level. Recall that the π * leaves workers and firms indifferent between forming the production unit or staying unattached, i.e., it solves the equation S(π * ) = 0. Using this condition, and substituting S into S(π * ) = 0 equation yields
Note that π * S is increasing in π * . Thus, we have an upward sloping line in the (π * , θ) space. The intuition for the upwards sloping optimal match formation curve is as follows: At any (θ, π * ) pair on the curve, we know that match surplus is zero. As market tightness increases, so does the worker's outside option (firm's outside option is always zero in equilibrium). Since the worker's outside option is higher at the new market tightness, the match surplus at the new market tightness with the old reservation probability will be negative. Thus, the firm and the worker will decide to separate. They will be indifferent between being unattached and forming a production unit at a higher π * level, resulting in a positive slope.
The second curve that determines the equilibrium is the free entry (or vacancy creation) condition. We get this condition in the following way: The equilibrium value of the market tightness should be such that the vacancies earn zero profit in equilibrium, i.e., θ solves V = 0; thus
where λ = 1 if F = Ω, and λ = 0 if F = Γ. Recall that F ∈ {Γ, Ω} is the equilibrium selection technology. Note that, since S(π) is linear in π, we can write the expected surplus as follows:
Thus, the free entry condition can be written as
Since both S and 1 π * [π−π * ]dF are decreasing in π * , this equation has negative slope in (π * , θ) space. The intuition for the downward sloping free entry curve is as follows: As the π * increases, it gets harder for firms to find workers, thus they need to incur vacancy costs longer (value of opening a vacancy decreases), thus the number of vacancies, and hence the market tightness, goes down. These two curves are required to intersect for the existence of an equilibrium. To get the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, I need a functional form for the firms' matching probability. I assume the matching function to be M = uv
to derive the condition below.
Proof. See Appendix
The inequality will not hold if the mean of the distribution F is sufficiently close to zero, the output difference by the quality of a match is implausibly small, or the total cost of opening a vacancy is implausibly high 14 . The condition does not bind for any plausible parameter values.
On the Uniqueness of the Equilibrium Observe that it is possible to have multiple equilibria. Recall that a pair (θ Ω , π * Ω ) is equilibrium if they satisfy equation (6) (in addition to equations (8) and (9)0. Similarly, a pair (θ Γ , π * Γ ) is equilibrium if it satisfies equation (7), in addition to equations (8) and (9) . If equations (6) and (7) are both satisfied, then we have multiple equilibria. Both, costless selection and effective selection technologies can be used. The relationship between the two equilibrium pairs is:
Since π * Ω > π * Γ , the expression on left hand side of the inequality is always be smaller than the one on the right hand side. Whether there will be multiple equilibria depends on the cost and distribution parameter values, as well as the reservation probabilities.
Employee Selection in the Equilibrium
If firms choose the effective employee selection technology, the equilibrium value of the reservation probability will be higher than the value in an equilibrium with less effective selection technology.
Proposition 2. If there is an equilibrium with firms choosing
How the equilibrium market tightness changes with the employee selection technology depends on the parameter values of the model.
The intuition for the more effective distribution to deliver a higher reservation probability is that when the firms choose the more effective distribution, they know that if they walk away from a match with the probability that is same as π * Γ (the reservation probability for Γ distribution), they can get better quality matches in the next meeting. Thus, they demand higher quality matches.
Firms choose the more effective selection technology if
Firms are more likely to select Ω if y g − y b is higher. Since high skill firms have a higher uncertainty associated with the match quality, they are more likely to use the effective employee selection technology in equilibrium.
Model Implications for Labor Market Outcomes
An unemployed worker's probability of finding a job, which I denote by p, has two components. The first component is the probability that the worker matches with a firm, f (θ). This probability is endogenously determined in the model, and it is a function of the equilibrium vacancy unemployment ratio. The second component is the expected probability of a worker-firm pair drawing a high enough probability of a match being good quality so that the parties decide to form the production unit. The reservation probability, together with the selection technology a firm chooses, determines the acceptance probability. Let F be the selection distribution the firms choose in equilibrium. Then, the job finding probability of a worker is
Note that the difference between the job finding probabilities of high and low skill workers can come from the difference in market tightness, the difference in the selection technologies implemented, or the difference in the reservation probabilities.
Similarly, the vacancy filling probability, denoted by h, is determined by market tightness, which determines the probability that the vacancy meets with a worker, and the acceptance probability of a match. Formally:
The other important moment is total job separation rate. Total separation rate is determined by the exogenous and endogenous separations.
The first term in equation above is the exogenous separations, which affects all of the matches. Endogenous separation, on the other hand, occurs only for matches with unknown match quality which have survived the exogenous destruction. Among those, the ones that are revealed to be bad quality gets destroyed. Using the relationship between good (or known) quality matches and unknown quality matches, which is given via the flow equation in definition of equilibrium, I derive that e n e n + e g = δ δ + (1 − δ)E F (π|X π = 1)
Substituting for e n e n +e g in equation for separations, we get
The total number of job separations depends on the exogenous destruction rate and the conditional expected value of the match being good quality.
Since the exogenous destruction rate δ is the same across sectors, the only source of a discrepancy between total job separation rates across skill groups is the differences in the conditional expected value of a match being good quality. The higher the E F (π|X π = 1), the lower the total separations. Observe that, under the assumption that Ω first order stochastically dominates Γ, for a given π * level,
However, high and low skill sectors will, most probably, have different equilibrium reservation probabilities. Thus, the assumption that Ω first order stochastically dominates Γ does not guarantee a higher separation for low skill. After some algebra on the equilibrium flow equations, one can show that the unemployment rate is:
Substituting δ from equation (11) and rearranging terms gives the familiar equation of u = s s + p
The unemployment rate depends on the probability of workers finding a job and the probability of them separating from their jobs to unemployment. To see whether the proposed model can generate labor market outcomes for high and low-skill workers that are consistent with the data, I utilize the following quantitative exercise.
Quantitative Analysis
I assign values to the parameters of the model to match some facts of the U.S. labor markets. The period length of the model is one month. I set β = 0.9967, to get an annual interest rate of 4 %. The bargaining power of the workers is generally set to a number between 0.3 and 0.5 in the literature 15 . This number corresponds to the empirical measures of match elasticity of unemployment 16 . I set the bargaining power of the workers in Nash bargaining to 0.36, a value commonly used in the literature.
Observe that multiplying c, κ, y g , y b , and b by the same number does not change the solution to the equation system. Thus, I normalize b in both sectors to 1. I also set y b = b. This is sufficient for bad quality matches to be terminated in the equilibrium. Moreover, this assumption implies that only the difference between high and low quality output matters for the equilibrium.
I assume the matching function to be M (u, v) = uv (u α + v α ) 1/α . This functional form naturally bounds workers' and firms' matching probabilities to be in the unit interval. Employee selection distributions are assumed to be Beta distributions. Although there is not direct evidence on the distributional form of the selection technologies, I choose the Beta distribution because it has support in the unit interval. Moreover, I assume the first parameter of both Beta distributions to be 1 17 . Remaining parameters of the model are the exogenous job destruction rate δ, matching function parameter α, the output a good quality low skill match produces y g ls , the cost of effective selection technology κ, and parameter values of Γ and Ω distributions. I estimate these parameters so that the distance between the values of the chosen moments (described below) in the data and the values of these moments in the model is minimized.
I use the following data moments. Davis et al. (1996) report that 23 percent of all annual job destruction is due to plant shutdowns in the manufacturing industry. I target 23 percent of all separations being exogenous in low skill sector in the steady state. The literature widely assumes the match elasticity of unemployment 16 Bargaining power is set to be the same as match elasticity of unemployment to get efficient outcomes in equilibrium (Hosios Condition). 17 In this model's equilibrium π * values will be low. Thus I need distributions with some mass in the lower tail. I normalized the first, not the second, parameter of the Beta distribution, because setting the second parameter of the Beta distribution to 1 gives low cumulative densities for low values of π. Output difference across skill
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Petrangolo et al (2000) to be 36 percent (Shimer 2005). I match the unemployment rate of 0.05 and job finding probability of 0.323 for low skill workers. To have the unemployment rate of 0.05 and the job separation rate of 0.017 requires a job finding probability of 0.323 in this model. This is because in the model the relationship between unemployment rate and the job finding probability is s s + p 18 . I also target the value of .294 for the steady state job finding probability of high skill workers. I match per worker output produced to be 79 percent higher in high-skill jobs. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) look at value added in high and low skill sectors and report a difference of 79 percent between the sectors. The expected value of wages of high skill workers are 90 percent higher, and the highest wage low skill workers can earn is 25 percent higher than the lowest wage in the steady state. Heathcote et al. (2008) report the college premium to be around 90 percent. Topel and Ward (1992) report that the cumulative change in wages over the first 10 years of work history that is associated with job change is around 33 percent. I set the ratio of the highest wage to the lowest in the low skill sector to be 25 percent, the number that is also used by Pries and Rogerson (2005) .
Results
The estimated parameter values are reported in Table 4 along with the other parameter values. The value of good quality output for high skill workers is more than 70 percent higher than that of low skill workers. The vacancy cost of a low skill job is higher than the amount of good quality output the job can produce. Although the vacancy cost of a high skill job is less than the amount of good quality output, the total cost, vacancy cost and the cost of more effective 18 Due to fluctuations over the sample period I have, the correlation between actual unemployment rate and steady state unemployment rate implied by matching model ( s s + p ), is not 1.
technology, is more than two times the good quality output the high skill job can produce. The total cost of a high skill vacancy is more than 3 times higher than the vacancy cost of low skill jobs. Although there is not direct evidence on the value of κ, Barron and Bishop (1985) report that total time spent in recruiting managerial, professional, and technical occupations is more than twice that of the blue collar and service occupations, and more than 50 percent higher than the clerical and sales occupations. Taking into account that the actual cost will be higher than the time cost, since the opportunity cost of workers who hire for high-skill occupations is expected to be higher as well, the value of κ is reasonable. While searching for parameter values, I do not impose the restriction that the more effective distribution, Ω, should first order stochastically dominate the less effective selection distribution, Γ. As Figure 3 show, estimated values of Ω and Γ distributions are such that Ω first order stochastically dominates Γ. The equilibrium values of various labor market outcomes for high and low skill workers are displayed in Table 4 . The model delivers targeted data moments. The unemployment rate and the job finding probability of low skill workers are the same as in the data. Observe that the model has the following relationship between the unemployment rate and job finding and job separation probabilities: u = s s + p . Thus, the job separation rate of low-skill workers, although not directly targeted, is the same as in the data. For high skill workers, the model successfully delivers a job separation rate that is as low as it is in the data. The model also replicates the discrepancy between high and low skill unemployment rates. Observe that neither the unemployment rate nor the job separation rate of high skill workers is targeted. Moreover, the difference in job separation rates across skill groups is due to the more effective selection procedure high skill firms employ. The market tightness skill groups experience is 0.56 and 0.45 for low and high skill workers, respectively. Although there is no data on market tightness of skill groups, these numbers imply an overall market tightness in between these two values. Market tightness for the US since 2001 is on average 0.46 19 . Although there is no data for vacancy duration by skill for the US, Danish data suggest that (Van Ours and Ridder (1993)) high skill vacancies have higher durations. The model, however, predicts a lower duration for high skill vacancies, compared to low skill vacancies. This is not because high skill workers do not spend more time in recruitment, it is because the market tightness in high skill sector is low. As a result of low market tightness (low numbers of vacancies), high skill vacancies fill up more quickly than low skill vacancies. The market tightness high skill firms face is low because cost of opening a vacancy (including the cost of the selection technology) is too high.
The results are robust to different plausible values of µ. Re-estimating the model parameters with µ = 0.4, and µ = 0.5 delivers targeted moments and changes other moments of interest slightly. For µ = 0.4, the model predicts a job separation probability and an unemployment rate of 0.0059 and 0.0196 for high skill workers, respectively. The job separation rate and the unemployment rate of high skill are predicted to be 0.0053 and 0.0177, respectively, for µ = 0.5. The results do not change if I normalize the first parameter of the distributions to 1.1 or 1.2, instead of 1.
To clarify the effects of employee selection technology, I carry out the following exercises. In the first exercise, I let firms use only the less effective selection technology, Γ. In this case, the only difference between skill groups in their equilibrium outcomes is due to the productivity differences. The third column of Table 5 presents the results of the model for parameter values given in Table 2 . The unemployment rate of low skill workers is 60 percent higher than the high skill unemployment rate. Although the difference in unemployment rates is high, it is not as high as it is in the data. Moreover, the reason for the unemployment rate discrepancy is mainly the difference in job finding probabilities between skill groups. High skill workers experience a high job finding probability because their labor market is too tight. Higher market tightness in the high skill sector generates a longer vacancy filling duration for high skill firms, compared to low skill firms. This is because opening a vacancy costs the same for all firms, and high skill jobs are expected to be more productive.
The last column of Table 5 shows the equilibrium of the model if Ω were the only selection distribution that was available without any cost. The difference between high and low skill unemployment rates is close to 50 percent. Like the previous case, the difference in unemployment rates is due to the difference in job finding probabilities. The reason that columns two and four are not the same for high skill workers is that, in the case where Ω is the only selection technology (column four), there is no cost (κ) for using Ω. Observe that it is the high cost of using effective selection technology that draws market tightness for high skill firms down.
Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes a new explanation for the unemployment rate disparity between skill groups. It is well documented that high skill workers have lower unemployment rates. Data also show that the reason for the lower unemployment rate of high skill workers is their lower probability of job separation. High skill workers are less likely to separate from their jobs because they are selected more effectively. Firms do more intensive and extensive employee search when hiring for high skill vacancies in the data. This paper uses a matching model with uncertainty about match quality and with two employee selection technologies that differ in their cost and effectiveness. In the equilibrium, high skill firms, which are the firms with higher productivity, self-select themselves into using more effective technology. As a result of the choice of more effective technology, a higher fraction of high skill firms end up with good quality matches, thus a lower fraction experience endogenous match termination. Consequently, high skill workers have an unemployment rate in equilibrium that is as low as the data, compared to low skill workers, as they have substantially low job separation rates. There is more work that needs to be done to explore skill bias in job separation rates. This paper focuses on the role of employee selection on job separation rates. In this paper, the driving force for high skill firms employing more effective technology is the productivity difference between high and low quality matches. Another possible reason is that learning about the match quality is slower for high skill jobs. This will not only directly contribute to the lower job separation of high skill, but also affect the employee selection procedures firms use. Whether the difference in productivity or in the speed of learning about the match quality is more influential on the choice of employee selection technologies of firms is an open question.
The model abstracts from interaction across skill groups. For future work, it will be interesting to explore the effects of interactions across markets on employee selection technologies of firms. There are also other possible contributors to the bias, such as firm specific training, that should be explored.
As π goes to 1, θ F E (π) goes to zero. Moreover, θ OM F (1) = (1 − µ) µ(c + λκ) (y g − b) > 0.
Thus for a value of π 2 close to 1; θ OM F (π 2 ) > θ F E (π 2 ). Let π 1 = 0. Observe that, this inequality means that at θ * Ω , π * Ω is not an equilibrium since deviation to Γ distribution is profitable at this point. Thus, it contradicts with the assumption that θ * Ω , π * Ω is an equilibrium.
